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1. Introduction 
The present financial crisis has led academics and policy-makers to re-consider the links among banks’ 
financial stability and changes in the competitive environment. In spite of growing number of empirical studies, 
especially after the start of financial crisis, literature fails to provide conclusive answers on the relationship 
between bank competition and stability. We contribute to the existing literature by conducting a bank level 
analysis of the relationship between concentration, as inverse measure of competition, and financial stability in 
the EU banking systems between 2001 and 2009. We investigate if the idea of decreasing concentration/ 
increasing competition in EU as a result of a single European market it fits with the issue of financial stability 
of the European financial system. Also, we estimate how banking competition behavior in the context of 
present international financial crisis impact banks’ financial stability. The traditional view on the relationship 
between competition and stability suggests that competition among banks has been a contributor to the 
instabilities that triggered banking problems in many countries (OECD, 2010). The banking empirical literature 
shows us two different views concerning the relation between competition and financial stability: the 
“competition-fragility” and the “competition-stability” view.  
The view that more competitive environment makes banks more fragile finds a confirmation in many papers 
that not only confirm the relationship, but also offer the channels for its materialization. The “competition-
fragility” view considers more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in 
reduced franchise value, encouraging banks to take on more risk to increase returns. Most of the researches 
confirming competition - fragility view use the franchise value hypothesis as the explanation for banks with 
higher market power being more stable (Beck et al., 2006)  
The other view - “competition-stability” view, argues that more market power in the loan market may result 
in higher bank risk because, on the one hand, the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder 
to repay loans and exacerbate moral hazard incentives of borrowers to shift into riskier projects and, on the 
other hand, it is possible that a highly concentrated banking market may lead to more risk taking if the banking 
institutions believe that they are too big to fail in the context of protection by the government safety net. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature on the relation between 
banking competition and financial stability. Section 3 describes the methodology and data used to investigate 
the competition implications on financial stability during across EU banking systems. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review  
The question of whether more competition is good or bad for banking stability has been intensely debated in 
academic, as well as policymaking and regulatory circles. The literature about impact of competition on 
banking financial stability has yet to reach a consensus and is split in three categories: the traditional literature 
that confirm competition-fragility view (Keeley (1990); Carletti and Hartmann (2002); Jimenez et al. (2007); 
Beck (2008); Boyd and Runkle (1993); Edwards and Mishkin (1995); Salas and Saurina (2003); Fungacova and 
Weill (2009)), recent empirical papers that validate “competition-stability” view (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Boyd et al. (2006), Schaeck et al. (2009), Molyneux and Nguyen-Linh (2008)) and 
other papers that validate both views and show that the relationship between bank competition and stability is 
complex one and even case dependent (Allen and Gale (2004); Berger et al. (2008); Andries and Capraru 
(2011)). There are differences between papers from the perspective of proxy variables used for competition and 
financial stability. De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007) used Z-Index and HHI as proxy for bank risk and 
concentration respectively, assessing the joint effects of bank ownership and market structure on banks’ risk 
profiles and financial stability for 133 no industrialized countries for 1993-2004. Schaeck et al. (2009) using the 
Panzar and Rosse H-statistic as alternative measure of the degree of competitiveness validate the competition-
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stability view. Berger et al. (2008) test the impact of market structure on the risk potential of banks for 23 
industrialized countries, using a nonlinear relationship between financial stability and market structure in 
banking, using NPL and Z-Index and equity to total assets ratio to proxy banking system stability and Lerner 
index and HHI based on deposits and loans as a proxy for market power and concentration. Their results 
confirm both views. Andries and Capraru (2011), using Lerner index and Z-score as proxy for competition and, 
respectively, for financial stability, validated both views, too. In case of old EU member’s countries and euro 
zone the competition stability view is validated, but for the new member countries group, competition-fragility 
is confirmed.  
3. Methodology and Data 
In order to test the impact of concentration on financial stability during across EU banking systems, 
following Andries and Capraru (2011), we are using a model with the following form: 
FSit = f (COMPit, Bit, BSjt, M jt )          (1) 
Where i, j, t represent bank, country and year itFS - financial stability; itCOMP  - banking competition Bit - 
banking specific variables (microeconomic level); jtBS  - banking system specific variables; Mjt  - 
macroeconomic variables.  
Because we work with a large number of short-term series and cross-section, we use the Generalized Method 
of Moments, the dynamic variant for panel data (Generalized Method of Moments – GMM, Dynamic Panel 
Data) 
We use the Z-score as a proxy for financial stability. Z-score is calculated as follows: 
 
)(
/
ROA
AEROAZ
σ
+
=           (2)  
 
ROA is return on assets, E/A is the ratio of equity and total assets and ı (ROA) is the standard deviation of 
ROA. This indicator integrates in the same formula the volatility of profitability and the leverage effect. A 
higher Z-score value implies a lower probability of entry into insolvency. It indicates the number of standard 
deviations that profits must fall below the average, so that it affects the equity. Z-score increases with 
increasing profitability or capitalization and decreases due to the income instability reflected by a high volatility 
of ROA. In other words, Z-score indicates the probability of insolvency due to increasing volatility of 
profitability and equity. In our estimates, we calculate the Z-score at the bank level. We consider, according to 
the literature, that the opposite concept of financial stability is the financial fragility, both on the level of 
banking institution. 
The most used structural indicators to quantify the level of competition and banking systems concentration 
are Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the concentration rate of the top five largest banks (CR5). HHI 
index is defined as the sum of squared market shares of banks operating in the respective market. The upper 
maximum value that can be reached by this index is 10,000, a value that indicates a monopolistic market, while 
the minimum value is 1/N, where N is the number of institutions in the system.  
A market with an HHI index level of less than 1,000 is a competitive market, an index level between 1.000 
and 1.800 means that the market is moderately concentrated and an index level higher of 1,800 means that the 
market has a high level of concentration. We use HHI to calculate the market share of banks in terms of assets. 
We use as control variables the logarithmic value of total assets (ln_ta) GDP growth rate - growth in real GDP 
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measured in percentage logarithmic (ln_GDP) and inflation rate - changes in the consumer price level in 
percentages (IR). 
In agreement with the literature (Berger et al., 2008; Schaeck and Cihak, 2013) we use a number of 
instrumental variables. Therefore, we consider the size of equity in total assets (eq_ta), the banking activity 
independence (bank_free), the market share of foreign banks in total assets (fba_ta), operating costs relative to 
total assets (overhead_ta ), the deposits in the system relative to GDP (fin_sys_dep_gdp) and the interest margin 
(nim_bs). The capital adequacy is measured as the ratio between equity and total assets. The banking activity 
independence is an index that tells us whether foreign banks can operate freely, barriers to opening new banks 
and the government influence in credit allocation. To assess the impact of competition on financial stability, the 
sample includes 923 commercial banks from 27 EU countries for the period 2001-2009. We take into account 
only the active banks, with information on the last 5 years.  
Bank-level data are obtained from the database BankScope and are expressed in euro, while data on the 
characteristics of the banking system and the macroeconomic variables are collected from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and Heritage Foundation. 
The estimates were made for the entire sample of 27 EU countries and groups of countries: old-new EU 
members, euro zone and outside the euro zone countries. We will also test the competition implications on 
financial stability during the crisis and pre-crisis period. 
4. Results and Discussion 
The results of estimations by group of countries and at the EU 27 level, according to different proxies for 
competition can be found in the following tables. 
 
Table 1. The impact of CR5 on Z-score 
 
Depended variable: Z-score 
 EU EURO AREA NON-EURO AREA OLD MEMBERS 
NEW 
MEMBERS 
Z(-1) 0.005787 (0.003567) 
-0.012463*** 
(0.001187) 
-0.525644*** 
(0.007776) 
-0.012889*** 
(0.001818) 
-0.324209*** 
(0.007257) 
CR5 -64495.20*** (18634.13) 
-705.9252 
(1672.257) 
-1746.902*** 
(649.5745) 
-8548.594**  
(3427.438) 
230.0240** 
(102.0927) 
LN_T
A 
33188.07 
(28485.39) 
3564.630 
(7075.502) 
56585.80*** 
(10862.72) 
3555.795  
(7450.358) 
1878.796*** 
(501.4906) 
LN_
GDP 
-3169.051 
(9969.306) 
-15129.54** 
(7498.171) 
7465.771*** 
(1369.877) 
-9736.242  
(6106.238) 
979.9008*** 
(161.4283) 
IR -90805.93*** (25250.67) 
-20349.30** 
(8445.881) 
-10575.21*** 
(1622.041) 
-21319.65* 
(10934.83) 
-1153.724*** 
(281.3254) 
Method GMM 
Effects 
S ifi i
Cross-section fixed (first differences) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented between brackets. 
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
As can be seen, in the case of CR5 (the market share of top 5 banks in the system according to total assets), 
all results are statistically relevant, less for the euro zone. In all cases, except for the new member states, 
increased concentration has a negative impact on financial stability, so it confirms the competition stability 
theory. The explanation for the new member states may be that, as a rule, the top five positions are held by 
strong international banks, which give the banking system a stable condition. 
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Table 2. The impact of HHI on Z-score 
Depended variable: Z-score 
 EU EURO AREA NON-EURO AREA OLD MEMBERS NEW MEMBERS 
Z(-1) -0.017166*** (0.001356) 
-0.014683*** 
(0.001152) 
-0.521349*** 
(0.012395) 
-0.016100*** 
(0.001344) 
-0.327604*** 
(0.005362) 
HHI 41.85989 (238.3362) 
-1.659462 
(48.95771) 
64.17266*** 
(6.304263) 
-7.699000 
(77.22989) 
14.21084*** 
(4.369833) 
LN_TA 6737.345 (6692.435) 
1089.800 
(6790.291) 
48840.59*** 
(9084.354) 
4402.045  
(7131.256) 
1072.700** 
(470.8235) 
LN_GDP -9673.023 (7906.528) 
-11501.10 
(7094.364) 
3606.742** 
(1166.004) 
-10956.70 
(6839.794) 
1217.620*** 
(202.5738) 
IR -15397.19 (10492.74) 
-12801.39* 
(6574.977) 
-16246.68*** 
(679.2585) 
-15755.18** 
(7860.553) 
-620.8207*** 
(225.1537) 
Method GMM
Effects Cross-section fixed (first differences)
Note: Standard deviations are presented between brackets. 
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
  
 
The results for the HHI are statistically relevant only for the countries outside the euro zone and the new 
members. Thus, it is clear the validation of the competition-fragility vision: the greater the concentration in the 
system, measured by the HHI index (i.e. less competition), the higher the Z-score indicator, therefore the bank 
financial stability increases.  
Therefore, the consolidation phenomenon has beneficial effects in the economies outside the euro zone and 
in the new member states. This can be explained, as in the case of CR5, by the presence of large international 
banks, as well as by mergers and acquisitions that brought new stronger entities, holding significant market 
shares in these markets. These institutions have, in addition to increased credibility, financial stability.  
 
Table 3. The interpretation of the impact of concentration on the Z-score 
 
Depended variable: Z-score 
 EU EURO AREA NON-EURO AREA OLD MEMBERS 
NEW 
MEMBERS 
CR5 Competition-
stability 
Statistically 
insignificant Competition-stability Competition-stability 
Competition-
fragility 
HHI statistically insignificant 
Statistically 
insignificant Competition-fragility 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Competition-
fragility 
 
Next we will analyze the groups of countries, trying to estimate the effects of the competition impact on 
financial stability, under the influence of the crisis and pre-crisis period. For this purpose we introduce dummy 
variables CRISES (2001-2007) and NONCRISES (2008-2009) which we multiply with the proxy variable for 
competition.  
Its estimated coefficient will reflect the magnitude and the direction of the competition impact on financial 
stability in the analyzed periods. For reasons of space economy we will present only the results relating to 
proxy variable for competition from determinant variables. 
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Table 4. The impact of concentration on the Z - score during pre-crisis and crisis periods 
 
Depended variable: Z-score 
 EU EURO AREA 
NON-EURO 
AREA OLD MEMBERS 
NEW 
MEMBERS 
CRISES*CR5 2048.821*** (753.3072) 
1120.428** 
 (541.3824) 
1595.253*** 
(204.9708) 
1259.167** 
(531.6992) 
-20.14004*** 
(5.955935) 
NONCRISES*CR5 -2354.071*** (836.5407) 
-1289.537** 
 (532.4615) 
-1665.265*** 
(222.4345) 
-1481.546*** 
(572.4543) 
28.73629*** 
(5.502459) 
CRISES*HHI 49.02839 (40.03367) 
23.29803 
(32.11526) 
83.21827 
(81.10614) 
58.36109  
(47.80545) 
-1.161914 
(1.410395) 
NONCRISES*HHI -15.77736 (19.15315) 
-9.302705 
(14.64046) 
-126.6997*** 
(16.94292) 
-32.47589 
(20.16442) 
1.255451*** 
(0.410023) 
Method GMM 
Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (first differences) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented between brackets. 
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
As we can see, the results are in some cases diametrically opposed to the estimate for the entire period. 
Therefore, we see that a decrease in CR5 positively influences financial stability only in tha case of the new 
member states. Otherwise, the decreasing of this indicator, which means increased competition, adversely 
affects financial stability. For HHI, the results were not statistically validated for any group of countries. 
An increase in concentration is beneficial for all groups of countries, less for new members. In the period 
before the crisis, as we can see, in the old-new member countries group, the results indicate the same impact for 
all proxy competition variables only for the new member countries. Therefore, in the pre-crisis period, in the 
case of the old member states, competition had positive implications on financial stability in the case of 
structural indicators, while as of the new member states, competition negatively influence the financial stability 
for all structural indicators. In the euro countries, non-euro countries group, the decreasing concentration in the 
banking systems, regardless of membership to the euro area, leads to increased financial stability. The 
influences of crisis and pre-crisis period determine weaker impact of competition on financial stability for new 
members than old member (the coefficients are smaller). 
 The positive effects of the increased concentration during the crisis can be explained by mergers and 
acquisitions among banks, which led to the emergence of new more stable entities. The new member states 
have banking systems with a smaller number of credit institutions and less developed, dominated by big 
international banks (the top five), which has been favourable in the pre-crisis period, but unfavourable during 
the crisis, probably due to decreased exposure, higher prices of resources from local markets and the capital 
erosion of these banks. The multinational banks, particularly European ones, retreated to their countries of 
origin, usually old member states, trying to strengthen their positions (this explains the opposite effect on 
groups of countries). Therefore, the consolidation process generally had a positive effect on financial stability 
during the crisis (less in the new member states), but during the pre-crisis period, the increasing concentration 
negatively affected financial stability. Therefore, banking competition from the perspective of decreasing 
concentration had positive effects in terms of financial stability in the period before the crisis, except for the 
new member states. 
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Table 5. The interpretation of the impact of concentration on the Z-score during the pre-crisis and crisis periods  
  Depended variable: Z-score 
 EU EURO AREA 
NON-EURO 
AREA 
OLD 
MEMBERS 
NEW 
MEMBERS 
CRISES*CR5 Competition-fragility 
Competition-
fragility 
Competition-
fragility 
Competition-
fragility 
Competition-
stability 
NONCRISES*
CR5 
Competition-
stability 
Competition-
stability 
Competition-
stability 
Competition-
stability 
Competition-
fragility 
CRISES*HHI Statistically insignificant 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Statistically 
insignificant 
NONCRISES*
HHI 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Competition-
stability 
Statistically 
insignificant 
Competition-
fragility 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results validate both views, depending on group of countries and pre-crisis /crisis period. In case of 
crises, concentration has a positive effect on financial stability, except new members. The influences of crisis 
and pre-crisis period determine stronger impact of competition on financial stability for old members than new 
members. The results demonstrate us that the increasing competition could be a factor of financial stability in 
EU countries, but it couldn’t be the same in case of crises. In this situation the regulators should be more 
concerned about stimulating competition and promoting adequate financial regulation and supervision for 
avoiding financial turbulences. 
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